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PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER
THE NONDISCRIMINATION CLAUSE
IN INCOME TAX TREATIES*
William C. Giffordt
A standard provision in bilateral income tax treaties between the
United States and its treaty partners is the nondiscrimination clause.'
Under this provision, each treaty country agrees not to discriminate
* Copyright © 1978, William C. Gifford. The author thanks Hollis Forbes Russell,
Cornell Law-School, Class of 1978, for his substantial assistance in the research and writing
of this Article.
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Member of the New York Bar.
1. Twenty-four of the twenty-seven income tax treaties which are currently in force
between the United States and its treaty partners contain a nondiscrimination clause. [For
ease of reference, each convention for the avoidance of double taxation on income between
the United States and each of its treaty partners is cited in this Article by the name of the
treaty partner.] Austria, Oct. 25, 1956, art. XVIII(3), 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923;
Belgium, July 9, 1970, art. 24, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463; Burundi, Kinshasa, and
Rwanda, Oct. 28, 1948, art. XX(3), 4 U.S.T. 1647, T.I.A.S. No. 2833, extended by Sup-
plementary Convention, Aug. 22, 1957, art. IV, 10 U.S.T. 1358, T.I.A.S. No. 4280; Canada,
March 4, 1942, Protocol para. 12, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983, amended by Supplementary
Convention, Aug. 8, 1956, art. I(d), 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916; Denmark, May 6,
1948, art. XVI(l), 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Federal Republic of Germany, July 22,
1954, art. XVIII(3), 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133; Finland, March 6, 1970, art. 7, 22
U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042; France, July 28, 1967, art. 24, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No.
6518; Greece, Feb. 20, 1950, art. XVI(3), 5 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 2902; Iceland, May 7,
1975, art. 7, 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 8151; Ireland, Sept. 13, 1949, art. XXI, 2 U.S.T.
2303, T.I.A.S. No. 2356; Japan, March 8, 1971, art. 7, 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365;
Luxembourg, Dec. 18, 1962, art. XX(3), 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726; Netherlands,
April 29, 1948, art. XXV(3), 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, modified by Supplementary
Convention, Dec. 30, 1965, art. XIV, 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6051; Norway, Dec. 3,
1971, art. 25(1)-(3), 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474; Pakistan, July 1, 1957, art. XVII, 10
U.S.T. 984, T.I.A.S. No. 4232; Poland, Oct. 8, 1974, art. 21, T.I.A.S. No. 8486; Romania,
Dec. 4, 1973, art. 22, T.I.A.S. No. 8228; Sweden, March 2-3, 1939, Protocol para. 7, 54 Stat.
1759, T.S. No. 958, modified by Supplementary Convention, Oct. 22, 1963, art. II(c), 15
U.S.T. 1824, T.I.A;S. No. 5656; Switzerland, May 24, 1951, art. XVIII(3), 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316; Trinidad and Tobago, Jan. 9, 1970, art. 6, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No.
7047; Union of South Africa, Dec. 13, 1946, art. III(l), 3 U.S.T. 3821, T.I.A.S. No. 2510;
U.S.S.R., June 20, 1973, art. X, T.I.A.S. No. 8225; United Kingdom, April 26, 1945, art.
XXI, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546, amended by Supplementary Protocol, March 17,
1966, art. 16, 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No. 6089 (also in force in its original form with
Barbados, Jamaica, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, see 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8103 (1971)).
The clause also appears in several income tax conventions which have not entered into
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against the nationals 2 of the other country resident in its territory by
taxing them more severely than its own nationals.3 Designed to assure
force. Brazil, March 13, 1967, art. 6, I id. 809 (1967); India, Nov. 10, 1959, art. XVI,
id. 3819 (1960) (treaty withdrawn by United States before becoming effec-
tive); Israel, Nov. 20, 1975, art. 27, 2 id. 4230 (1976); Morocco, Aug. I, 1977, art. 22,
id. T 9741 (1977); Philippines, Oct. 1, 1976, art. 24(I)-(3), id. 6627 (1976); Republic of
Korea, June 4, 1976, art. 7, l id. 14810 (1976); Thailand, March I, 1965, art. 23, 2 id. 7526
(1965); United Arab Republic, Oct. 28, 1975, art. 26, id. 8031 (1976); United Kingdom,
Dec. 31, 1975, art. 24(1), (2), (5), id. I 8103X (1977). In addition, both the Treasury
Department's Model Income Tax Convention of May 17, 1977, art. 24, reprinted in I TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 153 (1977), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital, art. 24, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVEI.-
OPMENT, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 41 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as OECD], contain nondiscrimination provisions. The three United States
income tax treaties which do not contain a nondiscrimination clause are: Australia, May 14,
1953, 4 U.S.T. 2274, T.I.A.S. No. 2880; Italy, March 30, 1955,7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S. No.
3679, extended by Exchange of Letters, Dec. 13, 1974, 26 U.S.T. 1088, T.I.A.S. No. 8097;
New Zealand, March 16, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2378, T.I.A.S. No. 2360. Cf. Honduras, June 25,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 219, T.I.A.S. No. 3766 (treaty lacking nondiscrimination clause was ter-
minated). None of the estate or gift tax conventions to which the United States is a party
contains a nondiscrimination clause, although a nondiscrimination clause does appear in
Article I I of the Treasury Department's Model Estate and Gift Tax Convention, reprinted in
I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 154 (1977).
Some commentators also refer to the nondiscrimination clause as the "equal treatment"
clause, see, e.g., S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, U.S. INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORA-
TIONS AND NONRESIDENT ALIENS at IX-109 (1970), and the "national treatment" clause, see,
e.g., R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-80
(1960).
2. Some treaties' nondiscrimination clauses expressly protect both the individuals and
corporations of each treaty state. E.g., France, July 28, 1967, art. 24, 19 U.S.T. 5280,
T.I.A.S. No. 6518; United Kingdom, April 26, 1945, art. XXI, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No.
1546, amended by Supplementary Protocol, March 17, 1966, art. 16, 17 U.S.T. 1254,
T.I.A.S. No. 6089. Other treaties state that the clause covers "citizens" but do not indicate
whether the clause protects corporate entities as well as individuals. E.g., Canada, March
4, 1942, Protocol para. 12, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983, amended by Supplementary
Protocol, Aug. 8, 1956, art. I(d), 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916.
3. S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, supra note I, at IX-109. The historical roots of the
nondiscrimination clause lie in the "most favored nation" and national treatment protec-
tions contained in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties which originated in
the 17th century within the Western Hemisphere trading community. The "most favored
nation" clause provides that treaty partner nationals will be subjected to no other or greater
tax and customs burdens than are imposed on the nationals of any third country. This clause
first appeared in the 1642 treaty between Portugal and Great Britain and was contained in
the first American commercial treaty, Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778,
France-United States, arts. II-IV, 8 Stat. 12, T.S. No. 83. Lidstone, Liberal Construction of
Tax Treaties-An Analysis of Congressional and Administrative Limitations of an Old
Doctrine, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 529, 537-38 (1962). Provisions similar to the "most favored
nation" clause today are contained in the bilateral income tax conventions between the
United States and Romania, and the United States and the U.S.S.R. Romania, Dec. 4, 1973,
art. 22(2), T.I.A.S. No. 8228; U.S.S.R., June 20, 1973, art. X(2), T.I.A.S. No. 8225. These
provisions, however, only require that treaty partner citizens shall not be subjected to more
burdensome taxes than are generally imposed on the citizens of a third country; a treaty
country is not required to afford to a treaty partner citizen national tax benefits granted by
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equal tax treatment in each treaty country for its own citizens and the
citizens of its treaty partner,4 the nondiscrimination clause protects the
nationals-of both countries from differential tax treatment abroad.5 As
applied to the United States taxation of treaty partner nationals and
residents, the nondiscrimination clause supplements the constitutional, 6
special agreement to citizens of a third country. Cf. Poland, Oct. 8, 1974, art. 21(2), (3),
T.I.A.S. No. 8486 (similar provisions applicable to "permanent establishments" and "com-
panieg"); Romania, Dec. 4, 1973, art. 22(2), (3), T.I.A.S. No. 8228 (similar provisions
applicable to "citizens" and "corporations").
The "most favored nation" provision, which merely secures for foreign nationals treat-
ment equal to that afforded all other similarly situated foreigners, differs from the national
treatment clause which requires that all foreigners receive the same treatment as domestic
nationals. Wurzel, Trade Agreements And Tax Privileges, 18 TAXES 484, 486 (1940). The
national treatment clause first appeared in the 1654 treaty between Portugal and Great
Britain and provided that the subjects of Great Britain "shall enjoy the same liberties,
privileges and exemptions as the Portugese [sic] themselves." Lidstone, supra at 538.
Article X of that treaty granted to the- English the right to transport their goods into
Portuguese ports "without paying any other or further custom, duty or sum of money
besides what the Portugese [sic] merchants should pay, if the goods and merchandise
belonged to them." Id. The 1660-61 Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain
and Denmark, the 1667 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Spain and Great Britain,
and all early British commercial treaties included a national treatment clause. Id.
The first American treaty to contain a national treatment clause was the Jay Treaty, Nov.
19, 1794, Great Britain-United States, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105. Article III of that treaty
required that Americans pay "no higher or other duties than would be payable by His
Majesty's subjects" and "[n]o higher or other tolls or rates of ferriage than what are or shall
be payable by [Englishmen]." Throughout the 1800's, the United States actively sought
treaties providing for reciprocal national treatment; because these treaties were aimed
primarily at securing protection for American trade abroad, they often "assumed
a very nautical cast." Lidstone, supra at 539; see R. WILSON, supra note 1, at 163. The
first American treaty to contain a national treatment clause specifically applicable to
taxes was the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, April 5, 1831, Mexico-United
States, art. IX, 8 Stat. 410, T.S. No. 203. R. WILSON, supra note 1, at 163.
4. Bilateral income tax treaties to which the United States is not a partner typically
contain a nondiscrimination clause. E.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, Sept. 9, 1966, France-Switzerland, art. 26, [1967] Journal Officiel de la Republique
Frangaise [J.0.] 9972, 772 U.N.T.S. 275; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, May 22, 1968, France-United Kingdom, art. 25, [1970] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmd.
4253), 725 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Aug. 11, 1971,
Federal Republic of Germany-Switzerland, art. 25, [1972] Bundesgesetzblatt II (Ger.) 1022;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Nov. 26, 1964, Federal Republic of
Germany-United Kingdom, art. XX, [1967] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 17 (Cmd. 3249), 603 U.N.T.S.
183. Nevertheless, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development has again rejected the feasibility of implementing a multila-
teral treaty among its 24 members, although the Committee has suggested that groups of
members might experiment in this direction. OECD, supra note I, at 15, para. 32.
5. See Wurzel, supra note 3, at 486. One commentator has stated that considerable
precedent supports the proposition that unfair discriminatory taxation of aliens is inconsis-
tent with principles of international law grounded in custom and usage. R. WILSON, supra
note 1, at 157. Recent international practice, however, appears too contradictory to permit
acceptance of this proposition as a clearly established rule. Id.
6. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as well as the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protect aliens. E.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426
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statutory, 7 and administrative 8 safeguards against discrimination.
Modern income tax conventions 9 typically express the nondiscrimina-
tion principle in three specific provisions, each designed to protect a
distinct class of treaty partner nationals: foreign individuals and enter-
prises; domestic enterprises owned or controlled by foreigners; and do-
mestic permanent establishments of foreign enterprises.' 0 As to the first
U.S. 67, 77 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). A taxing statute which discriminates
against aliens is not unconstitutional under the due process clause if the classification of
taxpayers is reasonable. Barr v. Commissioner, 51 U.S. Tax Ct. 693, 695 (1969) (resident
United States citizen held ineligible for dependency deduction for his nonresident alien son);
cf. Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442,450 (1924) (no fifth amendment violation when
tax is greater on domestic corporations than on foreign corporations).
7. I.R.C. § 894(a) provides that income of any kind shall not be included in gross income
to the extent required by any treaty obligation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(a), T.D. 7293,
1973-2 C.B. 228, 242. The section requires that any Code section that discriminates against
treaty partner nationals by including in their gross income items which are not included in
the gross income of United States citizens must yield to a treaty nondiscrimination clause.
This provision, however, does not prevent discrimination against treaty partner nationals in
the form of the denial of exemptions, deductions, credits, or other allowances available to
United States citizens. Since the former kind of discrimination does not exist under the
Code, I.R.C. § 894(a) has no practical application. See also I.R.C. § 7852(d) (IRS provisions
must yield to treaty obligations); I.R.C. §§ 891, 896 (President may proclaim retaliatory tax
on foreign citizens and corporations).
8. The IRS "cannot tax one and not tax another without some rational basis for the
difference." United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This rule prohibits one taxpayer from receiving less favorable tax treatment than that
accorded another "similarly situated" taxpayer. See International Business Machines Corp.
v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (member of a two-firm industry entitled to the
same favorable tax treatment afforded his sole competitor by a prior IRS ruling). A body of
case law defining the parameters of administrative tax discrimination has begun to develop
and will probably expand more rapidly in light of the provisions of the Tax Reform Act
allowing taxpayers access to private IRS rulings. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 1201(a), 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C. § 6110). See generally Gifford, Taxpayer
Discrimination: Some Speculations, CORNELL L.F., Feb. 1977, at 8.
9. Modern income tax conventions originated with the Convention on Double Taxation,
April 27, 1932, France-United States, 49 Stat. 3145, T.S. No. 885; the Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 24, 1936, France-Sweden, 181 L.N.T.S. 315; and the
Convention on Double Taxation, March 23, 1939, Sweden-United States, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S.
No. 958. See Wurzel, A Tax Agreement with Sweden, 17 TAXES 460, 460 (1939).
10. E.g., Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Convention of May 17, 1977, art. 24,
reprinted in I TAx TREATIES (CCH) 153 (1977). Article 24(1) provides:
Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other State to any
taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burden-
some than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other
State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, nationals who are subject to tax by a Contracting State on
worldwide income are not in the same circumstances as nationals who are not so
subject. This provision shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 (Personal
Scope), also apply to persons who are not residents of one or both of the Contract-
ing States.
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two classes the Internal Revenue Code is generally consistent with the
nondiscrimination clause; although there is little decisional authority in-
terpreting the extent of protection the treaty affords these taxpayers, the
Code contains only limited instances of potential discrimination."
A permanent establishment of a foreign corporation, however, would
seem to be subject to extensive discrimination under the Internal Reve-
nue Code with respect to taxation of dividends it receives, losses suffered
by its American subsidiary corporations, and credits for foreign taxes
imposed on its income. To date, no court or administrative decision has
recognized the Code's discriminatory treatment of permanent establish-
ments of foreign enterprises. 12 Moreover, the commentary interpreting
the typical permanent establishment clause, such as Article 24(3) of the
United States Model Treaty, sheds little light on the extent to which these
establishments are protected from discriminatory taxation.1 3
Article 24(3) of that Treaty provides:
The taxation on a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting
State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less favorably levied in that
other State than the taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the
same activities. This provision shall not be construed as obliging a Contracting State
to grant to residents of the other Contracting State any personal allowances, reliefs
and reductions for taxation purposes on account of civil status or family respon-
sibilities which it grants to its own residents.
Article 24(5) provides:
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other Contract-
ing State, shall not be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any taxation or any
requirement connected therewith which is other or more burdensome than the
taxation and connected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the first-
mentioned State are or may be subjected.
The United States Model Treaty also contains a provision which specifically requires each
country to allow domestic enterprises the same deduction for interest, royalties, debts, and
other disbursements whether these payments are made to its own residents or residents of
the other country. Because this provision concerns the tax treatment which each country
affords its own domestic enterprises, it does not properly fall within the nondiscrimination
principle. Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Convention of May 17, 1977, supra,
art. 24(4).
i1. The IRS has recognized and eliminated some instances of discrimination. Rev. Rul.
72-330, 1972-2 C.B. 444; Rev. Rul. 72-598, 1972-2 C.B. 451.
12. Experience in other countries also seems limited. Cf. Judgment of Dec. 19, 1976,
Nos. 84,774 and 91,895, Conseil d'6tat, France, noted in 16 EUROPEAN TAX. 312 (1976)
(court decided French municipal law issue and avoided the issue of discrimination against a
permanent establishment of a foreign corporation). But see Judgment of April 30, 1975,
Supreme Tax Court, W. Ger., [1975] Bundessteuerblatt 11706, noted in 16 EUROPEAN TAX.
164 (1976) (court found no violation of treaty's nondiscrimination clause since nationals of
the taxing country would receive identical tax treatment).
13. The only in-depth commentary which has addressed the permanent establishment
clause of any treaty appears to be that contained in the OECD, supra note 1, at 165-73,
paras. 21-55, and Oliver, Discrimination, 1977 BRrr. TAX REV. 148. The only official
comment on a permanent establishment clause is the official explanation of the United
Kingdom-United States treaty that is not yet in force, United Kingdom, Dec. 31, 1975, art.
24(1), (2), (5), 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8103X (1977). This commentary merely states that
1978]
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This Article will focus on the interpretive problems of the permanent
establishment clause of the Model Treaty and illustrate these problems by
reference to the specific circumstances in which they arise. The tax
principles and policies underlying the nondiscrimination clause will be
examined in an effort to formulate a consistent analytic framework which
resolves these interpretive difficulties. Finally, the Article suggests a
revised formulation of the permanent establishment clause designed to
avoid the present interpretive problems and effectuate the policies behind
the nondiscrimination clause.
THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The early tax treaties between the United States and its treaty partners
did not contain a provision which specifically addressed discriminatory
tax treatment of permanent establishments of treaty country enter-
prises.' 4 Permanent establishments of a foreign enterprise could only
claim the protection afforded the foreign enterprise itself under the sim-
ple formulation of the nondiscrimination clause, which typically provided
that "the citizens of one [treaty country] residing within the other [treaty
country] shall not be subjected to the payment of more burdensome taxes
than the citizens of the other [treaty country].' ' 5 Because this early
formulation did not make clear the extent of protection afforded perma-
nent establishments, 6 modern treaties have expanded the earlier nondis-
the clause "provides that a permanent establishment which an enterprise of one Contracting
State has in the other Contracting State will not be subject in that other Contracting State to
less favorable taxation than an enterprise of that other Contracting State carrying on the
same activities." Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Technical Explana-
tion of the Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation Signed on December 31, 1973, Treasury Department News
Release (March 19, 1977), reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8103DD, at 8107-55 (1977).
This "explanation" wholly fails to address the difficult interpretive issues surrounding the
clause.
14. For example, the Canadian treaty, Canada, March 4, 1942, Protocol para. 12, 56 Stat.
1399, T.S. No. 983, amended by Supplementary Convention, Aug. 8, 1956, art, 1(d), 8
U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916, prohibits discrimination against all foreign "citizens"
without defining the term "citizen" and guarantees those foreign "citizens" tax treatment
equal to that afforded to all United States "citizens" residing both home and abroad. A
number of later tax treaties also prohibit discrimination against all foreign "citizens" (or
"nationals"), but those treaties both define the term "citizens" as including legal persons,
partnerships, and associations, and limit the guarantee to tax treatment equal to that
afforded to United States "citizens" residing only in the United States. E.g., Austria, Oct.
25, 1956, art. XVIII(3), 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923 ("citizens"); Ireland, Sept. 13,
1949, art. XXI, 2 U.S.T. 2303, T.I.A.S. No. 2356 ("nationals").
15. Canada, March 4, 1942, Protocol para. 12, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983, amended by
Supplementary Convention, Aug. 8, 1956, art. I(d), 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916.
16. Under the simple formulation of the older treaties, a permanent establishment of a
foreign corporation must satisfy two requirements to receive protection against discrimina-
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crimination principle and now include a separate provision which focuses
upon permanent establishments. Typical of the modern formulation is
Article 24(3) of the Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty of
May 17, 1977, which provides:
The taxation on a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a
Contracting State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less
favorably levied in the other State than the taxation levied on enterprises
of that other State carrying on the same activities.
17
This rule is followed by a provision which limits its application by permit-
ting a contracting state to deny to residents of the treaty partner country
&&any personal allowances, reliefs and reductions for taxation purposes on
account of civil status or family responsibilities which [are granted] to its
own residents."'18
tory taxation: first, the corporation and its permanent establishment must qualify as a
"citizen" of the foreign country; second, the permanent establishment must qualify as a
"resident" of the country imposing the tax. See, e.g., FederalRepublic of Germany, July 22,
1954, art. XVIII(3), 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133; Switzerland, May 24, 1951, art.
XVIII(3), 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316.
17. Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Convention of May 17, 1977, art. 24(3),
reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 153 (1977) [hereinafter cited as the United States
Model Treaty]. The- 1977 OECD Model Treaty as well as at least 14 treaties between the
United States and its treaty partners contain similar expanded nondiscrimination provisions.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 24(4)
[hereinafter cited as the OECD Model Treaty], in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL 41 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OECD]; Belgium, July 9, 1970, art. 24(2), 23 U.S.T.
2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463; Brazil, March 13, 1967, art. 6(2), 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 809
(1967) (not yet in force); Finland, March 6, 1970, art. 7(2), 22 U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042;
France, July 28, 1967, art. 24(2), 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Israel, Nov. 20, 1975,
art. 27(2), 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 4230 (1976) (not yet in force); Japan, March 8, 1971, art.
7(2), 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365; Morocco, Aug. 1, 1977, art. 22(2), 2 TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 9741 (1977) (not yet in force); Netherlands, April 29, 1948, art. XXV(3), 62 Stat.
1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, modified by Supplementary Convention, Dec. 30, 1965, art. XIV,
17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6051; Norway, Dec. 3, 1971, art. 25(2), 23 U.S.T. 2832,
T.I.A.S. No. 7474; Philippines, Oct. 1, 1976, art. 24(2),2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 6627 (1976)
(not yet in force); Republic of Korea, June 4, 1976, art. 7(2), 1 id. 4810 (1976) (not yet in
force); Trinidad and Tobago, Jan. 9, 1970, art. 6(2), 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047;
United Arab Republic, Oct. 28, 1975, art. 26(2), 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8031 (1976) (not
yet in force); United Kingdom, April 26, 1945, art. XXI(2), 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546,
amended by Supplementary Protocol, March 17, 1966, art. 16, 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No.
6089; see United Kingdom, Dec. 31, 1975, art. 24(2), 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8103X (1977)
(not yet in force). The treaties with Poland and Romania also focus specifically on perma-
nent establishments of residents of the treaty countries. But, unlike the United States Model
Treaty, supra, these treaties only prohibit taxes on permanent establishments of residents
of the treaty countries that are more burdensome than the taxes imposed on permanent
establishments of residents of third countries carrying on the same activities. Poland, Oct.
8, 1974, art. 21(2), T.I.A.S. No. 8486; Romania, Dec. 4, 1973, art. 22(2), T.I.A.S. No. 8228.
18. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 24(3). For the full text of Article 24(3)
of the United States Model Treaty, see note 10 supra.
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The definitional provisions of the Model Treaty clarify the range of
taxpayers eligible for protection under Article 24(3). The permanent es-
tablishment clause itself extends protection to a permanent establishment
maintained in a contracting state by an enterprise of the other contracting
state. Article 5(1) defines a permanent establishment as a "fixed place of
business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried on."' 9 Article 3(l)(c) in turn characterizes the enterprise of a
contracting state as "an enterprise carried on by" a resident of that
contracting state.2" A resident of a contracting state is defined as any
person who, under the laws of that state, is subject to tax because of his
domicile, residence, citizenship, place of management, place of incorpo-
ration, or similar criteria.2 1 This definition is sufficiently broad to include
individuals, partnerships, companies, estates, trusts, and any other group
of persons. 22 However, the Model Treaty nowhere explains the critical
term "enterprise." Presumably, this term includes a broad range of legal
entities actively conducting business operations. In the absence of a
definition of "enterprise," a treaty country will presumably resort to its
own domestic law for guidance or request negotiations with its treaty
partner under the mutual agreement procedure of Article 25 to establish
this term's meaning. 23
II
INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS
The Model Treaty eliminates several interpretive difficulties in the
current income tax conventions between the United States and its treaty
partners. For example, most current United States tax treaties contain a
clause similar to Article 1(3) of the Model Treaty, which provides that "a
Contracting State may tax its residents . . . and by reason of citizenship
may tax its citizens, as if this Convention had not come into effect. '24
Without more, the question would immediately arise whether this "sav-
ings clause" overrides the nondiscrimination principle of Article 24(3),
since a United States permanent establishment of a foreign corporation is
19. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 5(l).
20. Id. art. 3()(c).
21. Id. art. 4(1).
22. See id. art. 3()(a).
23. Id. art. 25(3)(e). The term "enterprise" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code
but will presumably be defined in consultations held pursuant to the mutual agreement
procedure recently set forth in Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-19 I.R.B. 35. That procedure,
formulated to resolve issues arising under any income tax treaty to which the United States
is a signatory nation, appears to be unnecessarily cumbersome and time consuming.
24. United States Model Treaty, supra. note 17, art. 1(3).
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arguably a "resident" of the United States under Article 4(1).1 The
Model Treaty, unlike some current United States tax treaties, answers
this question by providing in Article l(4)(a) that the savings clause will not
affect benefits conferred by Article 24. Any other result, of course,
would nullify the nondiscrimination clause.
Another interpretive difficulty eliminated by the Model Treaty con-
cerns the range of taxes covered by the nondiscrimination clause. The
provisions of several income tax conventions apply only to the United
States federal income tax and its foreign equivalent-no mention is made
of taxes imposed by political subdivisions. 26 Without more, the nondis-
crimination clause in these treaties would appear to prohibit only dis-
criminatory federal income taxation. The IRS, however, has indicated
that it may interpret the clause as covering all federal, state, and local
taxes.27 The Model Treaty and many recent treaties expressly provide
that the range of taxes covered includes "taxes of every kind and descrip-
tion imposed by each Contracting State, or its political subdivisions or
local authorities.' '
25. Id. art. 4(1). But cf. Rev. Rul. 74-239, 1974-1 C.B. 372 (although nondiscrimination
clause and savings clause were listed by the IRS as among the provisions bearing on the
computation of a Canadian citizen's United.States income tax, the Service considered only
the nondiscrimination clause in reaching its decision).
26. Burundi, Kinshasa, and Rwanda, Oct. 28, 1948, arts. I, XX(3), 4 U.S.T. 1647,
T.I.A.S. No. 2833, extended by Supplementary Convention, Aug. 22, 1957, art. IV, 10
U.S.T. 1358, T.I.A.S. No. 4280; Canada, March 4, 1942, Protocol paras. 1, 12, 56 Stat.
1399, T.S. No. 983, amended by Supplementary Convention, Aug. 8, 1956, art. I(d), 8
U.S.T. 1619, T.t.A.S. No. 3916; India, Nov. 10, 1959, arts. I, XVI, I TAX TREATIES (CCH)
3804, 3819 (1960) (treaty withdrawn by United States before becoming effective); Ire-
land, Sept. 13, 1949, arts. I, XXI, 2 U.S.T. 2303, T.I.A:S. No. 2356; Israel, Nov. 20, 1975,
arts. 1, 27, 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 4204, 4230 (1976) (not yet in effect); Pakistan, July 1,
1957, arts. I, XVII, 10 U.S.T. 984,T.I.A.S. No. 4232; Union of South Africa, Dec. 13,1946,
arts. I, III(1), 3 U.S.T. 3821, T.I.A.S. No. 2510.
27. The IRS apparently adopted this position when it explained the amendments made to
the Swedish-Amdrican treaty in 1963. The original treaty, Sweden, March 23, 1939, art. 1, 54
Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958, explicitly applied to the United States federal income tax and its
Swedish equivalent but did not contain a specific definition of "taxes" for the purpose of
the nondiscrimination clause. Id. Protocol para. 7. The 1963 Supplementary Convention,
Sweden, Oct. 22, 1963, art. 11(c), 15 U.S.T. 1824, T.I.A.S. No. 5656, amended the nondis-
crimination clause of the original Protocol to define "taxes" for the purpose of the original
clause as including all federal, state, and municipal taxes. Although the amendment by its
terms appeared to expand the scope of the nondiscrimination clause, the IRS characterized
the amendment as merely adding a definition "for the sake of clarity," thus implying that
the scope of the nondiscrimination clause before the amendment was identical to its scope
after the amendment. See Statement of the Treasury Department, in S. EXEC. REP. No. 10,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1964); S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, supra note 1, at IX-1 13. In other
words, the IRS suggested that the language found in the 1939 Swedish treaty, which is
similar to the language found in the treaties cited in note 26 supra, prohibits all discrimina-
tory federal, state, and local taxation.
28. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 24(6); e.g., Federal Republic of
Germany, July 22, 1954, art. XVIII(3), 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S No. 3133; France, July 28,
1978]
60 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:51
Although the Treasury Department's model formulation eliminates sev-
eral problems contained in the current treaties, some interpretive difficul-
ties remain. The two principal interpretive problems in the Model Trea-
ty's permanent establishment provision are: (1) the meaning of "enter-
prises . . . carrying on the same activities"; and (2) the criteria for
determining what constitutes "taxation . . . not . . . less favorably
levied.' '29
A. "CARRYING ON THE SAME ACrIVITIES"
Discrimination under Article 24(3) is measured by comparing the taxa-
tion of the permanent establishment of the foreign treaty partner enter-
prise with the taxation of enterprises of the situs country "carrying on the
1967, art. 1(4), 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; U.S.S.R., June 20, 1973, art. X(3),
T.I.A.S. No. 8225..
The general application of the nondiscrimination clause to all "taxes" levied by each
signatory country raises two distinct problems not resolved by the Model Treaty. First, the
existing conventions do not define the range of levies which can be considered "taxes" for
purposes of the nondiscrimination clause. Although the clause in many of the treaties is not
confined to income taxes but extends to property, inheritance, gift, and similar taxes, cf.
Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 37-42, 363 P.2d
25, 40-44, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25,40-44, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961) (nondiscrimination clause
prohibits state personal property tax on airplanes unless the state is the airplanes' home
port); Trott v. State, 41 N.D. 614, 171 N.W. 827 (1919) (under estate tax treaty's nondis-
crimination clause aliens may not be charged a greater state inheritance tax than residents),
income tax conventions are not designed to afford protection against levies, such as tariff
duties or certain license fees, which can not properly be characterized as "taxes." Cf.
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, does not protect noncitizen from criminal penalty). Case law, administrative
pronouncements, and treaty commentaries offer little guidance in determining whether
certain levies are "taxes." For example, in Rev. Rul. 72-579, 1972-2 C.B. 441, United States
citizens employed in Great Britain made payments pursuant to the National Insurance Act
of Great Britain. The IRS ruled that the insurance payments made. by the American
taxpayers constituted an income tax for foreign tax credit purposes. This ruling suggests
that the capacity in which a foreign country exacts a levy, for example as an "insurer," does
not bear on whether the levy is a "tax" for the purposes of the nondiscrimination clause;
unfortunately, the ruling does not set forth criteria which govern the characterization of a
levy as a "tax" or non-"tax" exaction. See Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.RB. 6 (single
Indonesian production-sharing levy possessing both tax and royalty portions not allocated
into tax and royalty components but rather characterized as a tax in its entirety). See
generally Note, The Foreign Tax Credit for American Oil Contractors in Indonesia: An
Allocation Approach, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 318-27 (1977).
A second problem left unresolved by the Model Treaty is whether a treaty provision
limiting a state's power to tax is unconstitutional in the United States and other countries
where there is a divison of power and function between federal and state governments.
Relying on the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, a number of American courts
have held that state taxes must yield to treaty provisions requiring equal treatment between
citizens and foreigners. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56
Cal. 2d 1I, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961); Trott v. State, 41
N.D. 614, 171 N.W. 827 (1919).
29. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 24(3).
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same activities." The truncated language of Article 24(3) unfortunately
gives rise to an elliptical comparison-the same activities as what? Pre-
sumably, the object of comparison is the permanent establishment, al-
though the enterprise of which the permanent establishment is a part is
also a possible candidate. The former reading is consistent with the
purposes of the provision as stated in the 1977 commentary to the OECD
Model Treaty, namely, to end discrimination in the treatment of perma-
nent establishments as compared with resident enterprises involved in
similar operations.
30
An additional ambiguity lies in the reference to "activities." At a
minimum, this term protects a permanent establishment from discrimina-
tion vis-A-vis an enterprise of the situs country in the same sector of the
economy. However, "activities" might be interpreted to include not only
the conduct of business operations but also incidental conduct such as the
payment of taxes on profits derived from these or other operations.
These problems are illustrated by the tax treatment afforded the
"pseudo-parent" permanent establishment. Consider the case of a
foreign enterprise's permanent establishment in the United States which
owns stock in one or more United States subsidiary corporations and
controls them in the same manner as the parent corporation of an af-
filiated group of corporations. 31 If the permanent establishment were a
domestic corporation it would be allowed a deduction for at least 85
percent-and for 80 percentor more owned subsidiaries, most likely 100
percent-of the amount received as dividends.3 2 The effective United
States tax rate on such dividends would thus range from 7.2 to 0 percent.
Alternatively, the hypothetical United States corporation might join with
the 80 percent or more owned subsidiary corporations and file a con-
solidated return, with the result that dividends from the subsidiary would
be excluded from the income of the hypothetical American parent.
33
By its terms, Article 24(3) of the Model Treaty would seem to entitle a
United States permanent establishment of a foreign corporation to claim
the dividends-received deduction of section 243(a) of the Code3 4 or to join
in the consolidated return with the subsidiaries.35 However, the IRS has
30. OECD Model Treaty, Commentary on Article 24, para. 23, in OECD, supra note 17,
at 165.
31. The question of when shares are effectively connected with a permanent establish-
ment within the meaning of Article 10 of the Model Treaty is outside the scope of this
Article. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.8644(c) (1972).
32. I.R.C. §§ 243-246.
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a)(1) (1966).
34. I.R.C. § 243(a).
35. Many current treaties as well as the United States Model Treaty and the OECD Model
Treaty contain a separate provisiqn which determines the extent to which each treaty
country may tax dividends received by enterprises of the other treaty country. United
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allowed the permanent establishment neither the dividends-received de-
duction nor consolidation. 36 Although the IRS has not made clear the
reasons for its position, several possible arguments against affording the
permanent establishment the benefit of Article 24(3) may be posited. The
Treasury may consider it inappropriate to extend the substantial benefits
of the dividends-received deduction or consolidation because the larger
foreign enterprise of which the permanent establishment is a part is not
subject to tax by the United States. Without Article 24(3), this argument
is particularly persuasive as to the dividends-received deduction. When a
domestic enterprise receives this deduction, a loss of tax revenue occurs,
but this loss is partly offset by the withholding tax on dividends when the
profits of the enterprise are redistributed at the shareholder level. 37 No
corresponding offset occurs in the case of a permanent establishment
since its profits are distributed by the foreign enterprise to its sharehold-
ers, who would generally not be subject to the United States withholding
tax.3
8
Regardless of its equitable merits, the Treasury position cannot bejustified in the absence of textual support from Article 24(3). This support
can be found only by reading "same activities" as requiring examination
of the circumstances not only of the permanent establishment but also of
the entire foreign enterprise. This interpretation would involve a two-
stage comparison between the taxation of a permanent establishment and
its hypothetical domestic counterpart as well as the taxation of the foreign
enterprise and a hypothetical domestic parent. Under this analysis, the
imposition of a withholding tax upon shareholders of the domestic parent
is considered an "activity" which the foreign enterprise does not carry
on; consequently, the permanent establishment is not eligible for Article
24(3)'s protection against differential tax treatment.
This reading of Article 24(3) would in substance impose upon perma-
nent establishments and their foreign enterprises the same requirement
which is contained in Article 24(1) which governs the treatment of nation-
als-that the foreign taxpayer must be "in the same circumstances" as
his domestic counterpart. 39 Article 24(1) has been interpreted as requiring
States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 10; OECD Model Treaty, art. 10, in OECD, supra
note 17, at 31; e.g., Sweden, March 23, 1939, art. VII, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958, modified
by Supplementary Convention, Oct. 22, 1963, art. I(a), 15 U.S.T. 1824, T.I.A.S. No. 5656.
36. Schlumberger v. United States, No. 195-75 (Ct. Cl., petition filed June 27, 1975).
37. I.R.C. §§ 1441-1464.
38. See OECD Model Treaty, Commentary on Article 24, para. 33, in OECD, supra note
17, at 168.
39. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 24(1). For the complete text of
Article 24(1), see note 10 supra.
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that the foreign taxpayer and the hypothetical domestic counterpart be
similarly situated in all respects. The IRS has held that this "same
circumstances" test includes the payment of United States tax and is not
satisfied where the foreign taxpayer, unlike a United States citizen, is not
subject to United States tax on his worldwide income. 40 Under this
approach, Article 24(3) would protect only those permanent establish-
ments whose home enterprises are subject to United States tax on their
worldwide income on the same basis as their hypothetical domestic coun-
terparts.
This reasoning would also justify the denial of consolidation for a
permanent establishment and its domestic subsidiaries. A hypothetical
domestic counterpart to the foreign enterprise of the permanent establish-
ment would be included in a consolidation. However, the foreign enter-
prise would be included in a consolidation only to the extent of the profits
or losses of its permanent establishment. Moreover, since a foreign
enterprise's income from operations elsewhere in the world escapes taxa-
tion, the Treasury Department might maintain that it does not engage in
an "activity" in which a hypothetical domestic counterpart with similar
worldwide operations participates-payment of United States tax on
income earned abroad.
An additional illustration involves the foreign tax credit. Both Article
23 of the Model Treaty and section 906 of the Internal Revenue Code 41
allow a United States permanent establishment of a foreign corporation a
credit against its United States tax on foreign-source income for any
foreign taxes imposed thereon. The foreign tax credit allowed by section
906, however, is somewhat narrower than that allowed to a United States
corporation by section 901.42 Section 906 restricts the credit to foreign
income taxes paid "with respect to income effectively connected with the
conduct of a trade or business within the United States, '43 while section
901 contains no such limitation. Section 906(b) imposes the additional
limitation that foreign taxes are not to be taken into account to the extent
that they are imposed on income from sources within the United States
which is taxable solely because the foreign corporation was created or
organized under the laws of the taxing country or because it was
domiciled there. 44
Here the language of Article 24(3) arguably mandates that the United
States allow a permanent establishment of a foreign corporation the full
40. Rev. Rul. 74-239, 1974-1 C.B. 372.
41. I.R.C. § 906.
42. I.R.C. § 901.
43. I.R.C. § 906(a).
44. I.R.C. § 906(b)(1).
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foreign tax credit under section 901, to the extent that a domestic corpora-
tion carrying on the activities of the permanent establishment would be
entitled to the credit, and subject only to the limitation of section 904 of
the Code.45 Perhaps the Treasury could justify retaining the section 906(b)
limitation on the credit despite the nondiscrimination clause on the "same
activities" grounds; the hypothetical United States corporation would
presumably not be subject to tax by any foreign country on account of
being incorporated or domiciled there. In any event, the restriction on
taxes imposed on income effectively connected with the conduct of a
United States trade or business does not seem justifiable.
B. "TAXATION . . . NOT . . . LESS FAVORABLY LEVIED"
Article 24(3) shields a permanent establishment only from less favor-
ably levied taxation. This language differs from the separate nondiscrimi-
nation provisions which apply to foreign nationals and foreign-controlled
domestic enterprises which are protected from "other or more burden-
some. . taxation and connected requirements." 46 The vagueness of the
language in Article 24(3) and its variation from the language in Articles
24(1) and 24(5) present three interpretive problems. First, the focus on
less favorable rather than other or more burdensome taxation and the
absence of a reference to "connected requirements" suggests that Article
24(3) prohibits only differential tax treatment whose net effect upon the
permanent establishment is discriminatory. This emphasis on the end
result means that taxation under Article 24(3), unlike that under Articles
24(1) and 24(5), need not be in the same form and impose the same rate of
taxation and connected formalities on domestic enterprises and perma-
nent establishments of foreign enterprises and their domestic counter-
parts. 47 Consequently, Article 24(3) would appear to permit a different
method of taxation for permanent establishments in situations where the
imposition of the same mode of taxation would be impracticable. 48 How-
ever, where the different mode of taxation or connected requirements,
such as election, compliance, and audit examinations, were unduly bur-
densome relative to that imposed on domestic enterprises, Article 24(3)
would prohibit such disparate tax treatment. 49
45. I.R.C. § 904.
46. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 24(1), (5).
47. Cf. OECD Model Treaty, Commentary on Article 24, para. 10, in OECD, supra note
17, at 163 (suggesting rate of taxation and connected formalities must be the same for
nationals and foreigners under Article 24(l) and 24(5) of the United States Model Treaty).
48. See Barr v. Commissioner, 51 U.S. Tax Ct. 693, 695 (1969); OECD Model Treaty,
Commentary on Article 24, para. 22, in OECD, supra note 17, at 165.
49. For example, Article 24(3) arguably prohibits the unusual penalty of I.R.C. § 882(c),
the disallowance of all deductions and credits, imposed on foreign corporations which fail to
file a true and correct return.
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Second, some authority indicates that the nondiscrimination clause
prohibits only discrimination against foreign nationals as a class.50 In a
1943 estate tax case, Watson v. Hoey,51 a statute denying nonresident
aliens the estate tax exemption afforded citizens and residents was upheld
despite a treaty providing for nondiscrimination because the statute did
not unfairly discriminate against nonresident aliens generally. On the
other hand, the OECD commentary suggests that the clause protects
every taxpayer who is subject to heavier taxation because of his particu-
lar circumstances, even though foreign nationals, including permanent
establishments, are not discriminated against as a class.52
Third, the treaty appears to focus on the taxes imposed by each treaty
country alone and to prohibit each country from levying a higher tax on a
permanent establishment than on a hypothetical domestic enterprise car-
ryinig on the same activities. On the other hand, the treaty language
admits of an interpretation which for nondiscrimination purposes com-
pares the total taxes paid by a permanent establishment to both treaty
partners with the total taxes paid by its hypothetical domestic counterpart
to both countries.
III
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
The dearth of decisional authority and commentary on these interpre-
tive problems calls for an analytic framework to guide the application of
the clause in the future and to assist the reformulation of the permanent
establishment clause in unambiguous terms. This analytic framework
must be formulated with an eye to the tax policies and principles underly-
ing the nondiscrimination clause as well as the practical application of the
clause in specific situations.
The tax treaties between the United States and its treaty partners are
intended to secure tax equality and reciprocity between the treaty coun-
tries.53 This aim is reflected not only in the specific treaty provisions
which address particular items of income, deductions, and credits, but
also in the nondiscrimination clause, which applies generally to the entire
50. See R. WILSON, supra note 1, at 161-62.
51. 59 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
52. See OECD Model Treaty, Commentary on Article 24, para. 24, in OECD, supra note
17, at 165.
53. See Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271
(1890); Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Commissioners, 197
F. Supp. 230, 240-41 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Board of County
Commissioners v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 961 (1963).
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range of tax treatment afforded individuals, enterprises, and permanent
establishments. In interpreting the permanent establishment clause, the
United States courts and the IRS should construe its provisions liberally
in order to carry out the apparent intention of the treaty partners to secure
the goals of tax equality and reciprocity.54 This principle of liberal in-
terpretation would serve to evidence to treaty countries the United States
commitment to honor its treaty obligations and encourage these countries
likewise to construe liberally not only the nondiscrimination clause but
also the provisions of the treaty generally.55 The resulting full tax equality
between treaty countries would help to secure a further goal of tax
conventions: the elimination of a form of nontariff barrier to free interna-
tional trade and commercial activity.5 6
The policies underlying tax treaties suggest that an interpretation of the
permanent establishment clause as requiring an examination of the cir-
cumstances not only of the permanent establishment but also the entire
foreign enterprise is too restrictive. A country entering into a tax conven-
tion with the United States would typically expect that the permanent
establishment clause requires a comparison of only the two entities men-
tioned in the language of the clause-the permanent establishment and a
hypothetical domestic equivalent enterprise. In addition, the interpreta-
tion of the term "activities" as including the payment of taxes so as to
read into the clause a "similarly situated" requirement goes well beyond
the parties' normal expectation. The combination of both of these restric-
tive interpretations cannot but help to give treaty partners the feeling that
the United States is giving them less than they bargained for.
Moreover, such an analysis in effect nullifies the permanent establish-
ment clause's protection of permanent establishments. The hypothetical
United States counterpart of the foreign enterprise is always subject to
United States tax on its foreign operations, but a foreign enterprise is
typically insulated from United States tax on similar operations; conse-
quently, the absence of this tax upon the foreign enterprise will almost
always cause the permanent establishment to fail the "same activities"
requirement. In fact, this restrictive approach would limit the application
of the permanent establishment clause to a permanent establishment of a
foreign enterprise which had no operations other than the United States
permanent establishment.
A further difficulty with the Treasury Department's analysis is that it
raises reciprocity and tax inequality problems between the United States
and treaty partners who do not tax domestic enterprises on worldwide
54. See note 53 supra.
55. See Lidstone, supra note 3, at 548.
56. See R. WILSON, supra note 1, at 180; Lidstone, supra note 3, at 545-48.
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income. Consider the case of an Italian permanent establishment of a
United States enterprise subject to tax by Italy. If Italy taxes some
domestic enterprises only on income from Italian sources, 57 a hypothetic-
al Italian equivalent of the United States enterprise would only be subject
to Italian tax upon its Italian operations which correspond with the
operations of the Italian permanent establishment of the United States
enterprise. Because neither the United States enterprise nor its hypothet-
ical counterpart are subject to Italian tax on their American operations,
the United States permanent establishment and its domestic equivalent
enterprise carry on the "same activities." Consequently, the Italian per-
manent establishment of a United States enterprise would be protected
against discriminatory tax treatment by the Model Treaty, but, in the
reverse situation, i United States permanent establishment of an Italian
enterprise would not be covered by Article 24(3).
To avoid these interpretive difficulties, the term "activities" should be
read to refer only to the business operations which a permanent establish-
ment conducts in the country in which it is situated. No consideration
should be given to obligations incurred incidentally to the conduct of
business operations, such as the payment of taxes. This approach allows
a relatively simple application of the nondiscrimination clause on the
basis of a comparison of business operations and avoids complex tax
analysis which, in most cases, would nullify the protection afforded by
the permanent establishment clause.
The same principle of liberal construction should guide the courts and
the IRS in formulating standards for determining whether a foreign per-
manent establishment suffers "taxation. . . less favorably levied." The
permanent establishment clause should be interpreted to protect every
United States permanent establishment of a treaty partner enterprise who
is subject to heavier taxation because of its particular circumstances,
even though permanent establishments as a class receive equal treatment.
This interpretation avoids the more restrictive approach of the "class"
standard, which would deny protection to a particular permanent estab-
lishment that actually pays higher United States taxes and thus falls
outside the norm of the typical permanent establishment, which does not
suffer more burdensome taxation. By extending protection to a broader
57. Although the current tax convention between the United States and Italy does not
contain a permanent establishment clause, Italy, March 30, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S.
No. 3679, extended by Exchange of Letters, Dec. 13, 1974, 26 U.S.T. 1088, T.I.A.S. No.
8097, current negotiations between the two countries may produce a treaty containing a
provision similar to Article 24(3) of the United States Model Treaty. See U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Treasury Department News Release WS-1271 (Jan. 19, 1977), reprinted in 2 TAx
TREATIES (CCH) 9755 (1977).
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range of taxpayers, the "particular circumstances" approach is consis-
tent with the treaties' goals of full tax equality and reciprocity and avoids
retaliatory tax discrimination by treaty partners who view the nondis-
crimination clause as mandating a "particular circumstances" analysis.
Moreover, this approach offers a relatively simple objective standard of
discrimination and does not involve the evidentiary tangles and subjective
analysis which the "class" approach would entail.
58
As to the range of taxes relevant to the discrimination determination,
however, tax equality and reciprocity do not help to resolve the question
of whether the courts and the IRS should examine only the United States
taxes paid by a permanent establishment and its domestic counterpart or
the total taxes paid to both treaty partners. A permanent establishment
which pays. the same or a lower amount of total taxes to both countries
than its hypothetical United States counterpart is not placed in a less
favorable position vis-a-vis its counterpart even though the permanent
establishment may pay higher United States taxes. Thus a comparison of
the taxes paid to both countries is not inconsistent with the goals of tax
equality and reciprocity. However, this approach cannot be reconciled
with the literal language of the treaty provision which expressly protects a
permanent establishment that an enterprise of one treaty country has in
the other treaty country from less favorable taxation in that other treaty
country.5 9 This language focuses only upon the taxation levied by the
country in which the permanent establishment is situated and suggests
that taxes levied by the country of the foreign enterprise are irrelevant for
nondiscrimination purposes. Even assuming that this language admits the
"total taxes" approach, the principle of liberal construction of treaty
provisions would require the interpretation which examines only the
United States taxation, since this interpretation affords greater protection
to a permanent establishment of a treaty partner enterprise.
IV
A PROPOSED DRAFT
The current interpretive difficulties in the permanent establishment
clause stem partly from cryptic draftsmanship. As in the OECD Model
Treaty, the permanent establishment clause in the United States Model
Treaty appears to be drafted in a manner designed to accommodate
58. Taxpayers might encounter substantial practical and legal obstacles in obtaining the
data about the taxation of others necessary to prove discrimination against the class of, say,
all Italian enterprises with permanent establishments in the United States. A further difficul-
ty would be defining the appropriate "class."
59. United States Model Treaty, supra note 17, art. 24(3).
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS
competing viewpoints on the interpretive problems which have been
unearthed.' Such draftsmanship may serve initially to encourage coun-
tries to agree to the treaty terms by obfuscating potential areas of disa-
greement; however, the danger that subsequent inconsistent interpreta-
tions by treaty countries may lead to retaliatory tax discrimination offsets
the initial benefit.
Alerted to the interpretive difficulties contained in the current perma-
nent establishment clause, countries entering into an income tax treaty
should negotiate an expanded permanent establishment clause which is
mutually acceptable to both countries. Negotiation of the permanent
establishment clause should prove no more difficult than negotiation of
any other term in the treaty, for the negotiation of all tax treaty terms
involves the same essential problem: the sorting out between countries of
residence and countries of source the right to tax certain types of income.
Ideally, a treaty should specifically address all major areas of possible
discrimination against permanent establishments. For instance, detailed
provisions could be established for the treatment of dividends received,
consolidation, and foreign tax credit problems. However, demanding
such precision would, in many cases, make treaty negotiation too cum-
bersome and impede international efforts to end tax discrimination. A
more feasible alternative is a revised model draft that expressly provides
several rules of interpretation which resole the problems encountered in
the current version of the permanent establishment clause. Such a draft
could be written as follows:
The taxation of a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a
Contracting State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less
favorably levied in the other State than the taxation levied on an enterprise
of the other State carrying on the same activities as the permanent estab-
lishment. For the purposes of the preceding sentence: (1) "activities"
refers only to the business operations conducted by the permanent estab-
lishment and does not include incidentally incurred obligations, such as
the payment of taxes; and (2) "taxation" refers only to the taxes levied by
the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is located,
without regard for the taxes levied by the other Contracting State. This
clause is intended to protect each particular permanent establishment of a
Contracting State from less favorable taxation vis-A-vis equivalent enter-
prises of the other Contracting State, regardless of the tax treatment
permanent establishments receive as a class.
60. See OECD Model Treaty, Commentary on Article 24, paras. 38-50, in OECD, supra
note 17, at 169-72 (paragraphs 45 and 50 specifically encourage the contracting states to
settle interpretive difficulties "in bilateral-negotiations in the light of their peculiar circum-
stances").
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Although some countries may not wish to adopt a treaty provision which
extends protection as broadly as the proposed draft, this draft at least
isolates the problems which confront countries negotiating an income tax
convention and provides countries with some basis for negotiating a
mutually acceptable permanent establishment clause.
